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SOUTH AFRICA’S CRIMINALIZATION OF 
“HURTFUL” COMMENTS: WHEN THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN DIGNITY AND 
EQUALITY TRANSFORMS INTO THE 
DESTRUCTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The prohibition of hate speech . . . has as its ideal aspiration the 
elimination of discrimination and the promotion of dignity and 
equality. However, any regulation in these areas must curtail 
freedom of expression, which itself is held up as central to 
democratic freedom, equality and dignity.1 
INTRODUCTION 
In matters of international human rights, a tenuous balance must be 
struck between promoting rights and limiting freedoms. South Africa’s 
attempts to criminalize hate speech in an effort to rise above the inequities 
endured under the apartheid regime exemplify this difficulty. 
Recent hate speech legislation in South Africa has highlighted the 
conflict between the right to dignity and the right to freedom of speech.2 
The Draft Prohibition on Hate Speech Bill3 (“Draft Bill”) “penalizes any 
person who in public advocates hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, 
gender or religion that could, in the circumstances, reasonably be 
construed to demonstrate an intention to be hurtful, harmful . . . to incite 
harm4 [or to] undermine human dignity.”5 The Draft Bill has been 
controversial since its public unveiling.6 This is not the first time, 
however, that South Africa has introduced legislation which, according to 
 1. CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROMOTION OF EQUALITY 
AND PREVENTION OF UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION ACT 89 (Cathi Albertyn et al. eds., Witswatersrand 
University Press 2001). 
 2. Advocates share a concern that freedom of expression will be further limited. Press Release, 
International Federation of Journalists: African Bureau, FXI Warns of Dangers in Proposed Hate 
Speech Bill, (June 7, 2004), http://www.ifjafrique.org/english/dernouvelles/090604_2.htm [hereinafter 
FXI Warnings] (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 3. Draft Prohibition of Hate Speech Bill, 2004, (Proposed Official Draft), available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/bills/040430draftproh.pdf [hereinafter Draft Bill]. 
 4. See Judith February, This Week in Parliament (May 31–June 4, 2004), POL’Y & L. ONLINE 
NEWS, June 4, 2004, http://www.polity.org.za/pol/opinion/judith/?show=51737 (examining the 
language of the Draft Bill and the evolution of the Equality Act) (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 5. Draft Bill, supra note 3, art. 2, § 1(g). 
 6. FXI Warnings, supra note 2. 
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critics, undermines freedom of expression.7 The Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (“Equality Act”) 
was met with similar concerns.8 
This Note seeks to illustrate that post-constitutional legislation aimed at 
regulating hate speech is unnecessary, unworkable, and incapable of 
fulfilling its object and purpose.9 Notions of the right to dignity are best 
preserved by eliminating such legislation and relying solely on provisions 
of the Constitution. Moreover, current constitutional provisions provide 
broad freedoms of expression while simultaneously meeting South 
Africa’s international obligations. 
To this end, Part I will explore the conflict between dignity and hate 
speech and will demonstrate the heightened importance of dignity in South 
Africa. Part II will describe the rights and limitations associated with the 
freedom of expression under the post-apartheid Constitution. Part III will 
analyze South Africa’s Constitution, the Equality Act, and the Draft Bill, 
illuminating the flaws, inconsistencies, and the overly restrictive nature of 
the post-constitutional legislation. Part IV highlights the lack of necessity 
in regard to the post-constitution legislation. Finally, this Note concludes 
that, in order to preserve the rights and freedoms of the people of South 
Africa, and to further the notion of human dignity, it is in the South 
African government’s best interest to eliminate the hate speech portions of 
the Equality Act and to refrain from endorsing the Draft Bill. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Emergence of the Right to Dignity and its Conflict with Freedom of 
Speech 
Motivated by the horrors of World War II, representatives from forty-
eight countries gathered to sign the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948.10 Their goal was to create a list of basic rights that the 
 7. Cf. South Africa Ushers In Controversial Equality Law, REUTERS, Sept. 1, 2000, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/09/01/racism.safrica.reut/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
 8. See id. (“Government opponents and legal critics have criticized the [Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act] which . . . in some cases puts the onus on someone 
accused of discrimination to prove innocence.”). 
 9. CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 1, at 3. The goal of the Equality Act and 
the Draft Bill is “to give substance to the constitutional commitment to equality, by providing a legal 
mechanism with which to confront, address and remedy past and present forms of . . . unfair 
discrimination and inequality . . . [and] to reinforce South Africa’s international treaty obligations 
. . . .” Id. 
 10. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71 U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st 
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international community agreed were “inherent” and “equal” for all human 
beings.11 The right to dignity was particularly prominent.12 However, the 
right to freedom of speech is also considered to be a human right of the 
utmost importance, and was correspondingly articulated as a fundamental 
principle of the Declaration.13 Hence, the initial codification of 
international human rights law recognized both the right of dignity and the 
right to freedom of expression; yet, ironically, the indiscriminate exercise 
of one right can nullify the opposing right.14 This conflict between the 
right to dignity and freedom of speech is not unique to South Africa;15 
similar conflicts can be found in virtually every human rights convention 
that followed the UDHR.16 Moreover, hate speech exacerbates tension 
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html 
[hereinafter UDHR]; cf. The U.N. Ass’n in Can., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
http://www.unac.org/rights/actguide/udhr.html (noting that UDHR was adopted without one dissenting 
vote, indicating the universal acceptance of the principles found therein).  
 11. UDHR, supra note 10, pmbl. 
 12. Id. (“[R]ecognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 13. Id. 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have 
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall 
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as 
the highest aspiration of the common people. 
Id. (emphasis added). See also Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 49 (1976).  
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a [democratic] 
society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man . . . 
it is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded 
as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the 
State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society.” 
Id. 
 14. See UDHR, supra note 10, art. 30 (“Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as 
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed 
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.”). 
 15. A multitude of State Constitutions include provisions codifying both the right to dignity and 
freedom of expression. See, e.g., XIAN FA [Constitution] arts. 38, 41 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www.usconstitution.net/china.html; GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] arts. 1, 5 (F.R.G. 1949), 
available at http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/eurodocs/germ/ggeng.html; INDIA CONST. arts. 14–19, 
available at http://www.constitution.org/cons/india/const.html. 
 16. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), pmbl. U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Jan. 3, 
1976) [hereinafter ICESCR] (“Recognising that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the 
human person . . .”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
pmbl. U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976) 
[hereinafter ICCPR] (using the same language found in the ICESCR); Organization of African Unity, 
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Oct. 21, 1986, O.A.U Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (“[F]reedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the 
achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples.”); League of Arab States, Arab 
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between dignity and freedom of speech.17 Recognizing this discord is 
crucial in analyzing the legitimacy of a state’s legislation because the state 
often has obligations concerning hate speech based upon the conventions 
to which it is a party.18 Yet, given the emphasis placed upon dignity by 
human rights declarations19 and national constitutions,20 it is apparent that 
the global community at large21 finds the right to free speech subordinate 
to the right to dignity.22 
Charter on Human Rights (reprinted in 18 HUM. RTS. L.J. 151 (1997) (“Given the Arab nation’s belief 
in human dignity since God honoured it by making the Arab World the cradle of religions and the 
birthplace of civilizations which confirmed its right to a life of dignity based on freedom, justice and 
peace.”); Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 
O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948) 
(reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992)) (“All men are born free and equal, in dignity and in 
rights, and, being endowed by nature with reason and conscience, they should conduct themselves as 
brothers one to another.”). 
 17. Note that hate speech is different from hate crimes. Hate crimes involve acts which are 
criminal offenses, the most common of which is assault. Hate speech involves only words, however, it 
can include language that incites others to take violent actions. See SAMUAL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: 
THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY 9 (1994). For an in-depth discussion of hate speech, 
see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1995); ALAN 
HAWORTH, FREE SPEECH (1998); and LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986). 
 18. For a complete list of relevant international treaty obligations binding South Africa on issues 
of equality and non-discrimination, see CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 1, at 3. 
These include: the ICCPR, supra note 16; the ICESCR, supra note 16; Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 107th 
plen. mtg., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, (Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]; Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Race Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, Annex 20, 
1406th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter CERD]; the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 61st plen. mtg., Supp. No. 49, 
U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Sept. 2, 1990). 
 19. See supra note 16. 
 20. See Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe adopted by consensus by the 
European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003, submitted to the President of the European 
Council in Rome on 18 July 2003, Article II-1 Human Dignity (“Human dignity is inviolable. It must 
be respected and protected.”); XIAN FA art. 38 (“The personal dignity of citizens of the People’s 
Republic of China is inviolable. Insult, libel, false charge, or frame-up directed against citizens by any 
means is prohibited.”); S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 10 (“Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to 
have their dignity respected and protected.”); GG art. 1(1) (“The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To 
respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”). 
 21. The United States, however, is an exception. Referencing recent incidents of hate speech in 
South Africa, Karthy Govender, the South African Commissioner of the Human Rights Commission, 
recently stated that “freedom of expression was a fundamental right in a democracy. By the same 
token our courts are clear that the freedom of expression is not a supreme right as in the United States 
of America Constitution.” Kill the Boer Slogan Outlawed (July 17, 2003), http://www.news24.com/ 
News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_1388921,00.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2005). 
 22. Of particular note are the similarities between Germany and South Africa. Considering 
Germany’s policies is crucial to recognizing South Africa’s aims and how those aims may manifest 
themselves. Close similarities exist between these two nations regarding historic discrimination, 
inequality, violence, and the resulting focus on the right to dignity in legislation. Germany’s 
Constitution emphasizes the right to human dignity and relies on that right in interpreting the rest of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol5/iss1/8
p187 Haigh book pages.doc  3/2/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
2006] SOUTH AFRICA’S CRIMINALIZATION OF HURTFUL COMMENTS 191 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. South Africa’s Unique History23 
The first South African laws aimed at criminalizing statements that 
could possibly lead to racial hostility were enacted in 1927.24 These laws 
made it a criminal offense to articulate “any word or [engage in] any other 
act or thing whatever with intent to promote any feeling of hostility 
between natives and Europeans.”25 However, the 1927 Act and subsequent 
acts were used to curb any speech aimed at ending racial oppression made 
by the indigenous population.26 Under the 1927 Act, ”[a]ll the reported 
the document. Article 6 of the German Constitution or Basic Law (Grundgesetz) provides: “The 
dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.” GG 
art. 6. 
 As Donald Kommers has noted: 
Germany’s emphasis on dignity is nevertheless important, and for three reasons: First, the 
principle of human dignity makes normative demands on the state; second, it informs the 
scope and meaning of all the rights and guarantees of the Basic Law; and third, it is the source 
of the so-called objective value that the Federal Constitutional Court has inferred from the 
Basic Law’s principles and structures. In short, the Constitutional Court envisions the Basic 
Law as a unified structure of objective principles and rights crowned by the master value of 
human dignity. 
Donald Kommers, Address on Receiving Honorary Doctor of Law Degree at Karl’s University, 
Heidelberg, Germany (July 1998), available at http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/7_dokument_ 
dok_pdf_4904_2.pdf. For an in-depth discussion of the right of dignity’s impact on speech in 
Germany, see Rainer Hofmann, Incitement to National and Racial Hatred: The Legal Situation in 
Germany, in ARTICLE 19: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE AGAINST CENSORSHIP, STRIKING A BALANCE: 
HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 159 (Sandra Colivar et al. eds., 
1992). 
 Delivering the Third Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture in May 2000, the President of the South 
African Constitutional Court, Judge Arthur Chaskalson, stated:  
The affirmation of human dignity as one of the founding values of the Constitution is 
significant. The interim Constitution emphasized the values of democracy, freedom and 
equality. Although dignity is immanent in these values and in the rights entrenched in the 
interim Constitution’s Bill of Rights, its role as a foundational value of the constitutional 
order was not acknowledged in specific terms until the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. 
Consistently with this, the 1996 Constitution now refers to the “inherent dignity” of all 
people, thus asserting that respect for human dignity, and all that flows from it, as an attribute 
of life itself, and not a privilege granted by the state. 
Arthur Chaskalson, President of the S. African Const. Ct. Third Fischer Memorial Lecture (May 18, 
2000), in The Third Bram Fischer Lecture: Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of Our 
Constitutional Order, 16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 193, 196 (2000). 
 23. For a general discussion of the history of racial hostility laws in South Africa, see Gilbert J. 
Marcus, Racial Hostility: The South African Experience, in ARTICLE 19: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE 
AGAINST CENSORSHIP, STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION 208, 208–22 (Sandra Colivar et al. eds., 1992). 
 24. Native Administration Act of 1927, cited in Marcus, supra note 23, at 210. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 208–13 (discussing the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950; The Riotous 
Assemblies Act of 1956; The Publications and Entertainment Act of 1963; and The Publications Act of 
1974). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p187 Haigh book pages.doc  3/2/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
192 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 5:187 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cases concern[ed] charges of inciting hostility among blacks toward the 
white section of the community rather than cases of whites who cause[d] 
feelings of racial hostility by racially abusive comments.”27 Further, these 
measures were used to fine, imprison,28 and forcibly remove members of 
the black population who spoke out against the apartheid system.29 Thus, 
the laws had little to do with protecting individuals from racial abuse.30 
The final apartheid-era law used to oppress the indigenous population via 
limitations on speech was the Internal Security Act of 1982.31 This law 
effectively prohibited all speech criticizing the government’s race 
policies.32 
The history of racism has left deep scars in South Africa. The legacy 
left to South Africans is one of humiliation, untold suffering, and death. 
Moreover, South African history demonstrates that “moral indifference 
toward or active encouragement of manifestations of hatred leads to the 
destruction of civilized living, war, [and] even holocaust.”33 
Following the end of apartheid, the African National Congress (ANC) 
became the dominant political party. The ANC had been very active in 
 The Publications Act of 1974, for example, contains provisions aimed at preventing publication of 
anything that could incite racial hostility or could amount to an expression of ridicule or contempt for a 
section of the population. Id. As its predecessors, it looked race-neutral, but was used almost 
exclusively to bar anti-apartheid views. Id. 
 27. South African History Online, Chronology: 1900s, http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/ 
chronology/main-chronology-1920s.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2005). For a general discussion on the 
role of censorship in post-apartheid South Africa, see Lene Johannessen, Should Censorship of Racist 
Publications Have a Place in the New South Africa?, in ARTICLE 19: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE 
AGAINST CENSORSHIP, STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION 223–37 (Sandra Colivar et al. eds., 1992). 
 28. Marcus, supra note 23, at 214–19 (discussing key cases of prosecution under these laws). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 213–14. Based on parliamentary discussions, the goals of these acts were actually to 
suppress the governmental threat arising from the organization of the black working class, and to limit 
the influence of black community leaders. Id. 
 31. Id. This Act consolidated South Africa’s existing laws concerning racial hostility.  
[A]ny person who, with the intent to achieve the object of bringing about or promoting “any 
constitutional, political, industrial, social or economic change in the Republic,” causes, 
encourages or foments feelings of hostility between different population groups or attempts to 
do so, shall be guilty of the offense of subversion. 
Id. Moreover, this Act provided for, inter alia, detention without trial, arrest without a warrant, 
exclusion of legal representation and the administrative infringement of basic human rights that could 
not be reviewed by the courts. See Stephen de la Harpe & Tharien van der Walt, Can Security 
Legislation Stand up to the Challenge of Ensuring the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms?: A 
South African Perspective, NEW THINKING (Summer 2003), http://www.new-thinking.org/journal/ 
securitylegislation.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2005). 
 32. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 212. 
 33. Kevin Boyle, Overview of a Dilemma: Censorship versus Racism, in ARTICLE 19: 
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE AGAINST CENSORSHIP, STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 1, 2 (Sandra Colivar et al. eds., 1992). 
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reform movements in South Africa for over a half-century.34 The ANC 
established the Freedom Charter (“Charter”), which was adopted in 
1955.35 This document embodied the conflict between the right to dignity 
and freedom of speech. The Charter guaranteed the “right to speak” and 
also provided that “preaching and practice of national, race, or colour 
discrimination and contempt shall be punishable as a crime.”36 When the 
South African Constitution was rewritten under the ANC government in 
1996, it included many of the Charter’s principles.37 Hence, the conflict 
between these two rights was maintained. 
C. The Role of Dignity in South African Jurisprudence 
South Africa’s troubled past has clearly influenced the development of 
its Constitution,38 which was created to serve as an instrument of 
transformation.39 The effort to overcome this history fostered the creation 
 34. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 208. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. (citations omitted). 
 37. S. AFR. CONST. 1996. 
 38. As noted by South African Judge Kreigler: 
The South African Constitution is primarily and emphatically an egalitarian Constitution. The 
supreme laws of comparable constitutional states may underscore other principles and rights. 
But in light of our own particular history, and our vision for the future, a Constitution was 
written with equality at its center. Equality is our Constitution’s focus and its organizing 
principle. 
The President of the RSA and another v. Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 68 (S. Afr.) (Judge Kreigler). 
 39.  
We, the people of South Africa, Recognise the injustices of our past; Honour those who 
suffered for justice and freedom in our land; Respect those who have worked to build and 
develop our country; and Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our 
diversity. We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as 
the supreme law of the Republic so as to Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society 
based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; Lay the foundations 
for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and 
every citizen is equally protected by law; Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free 
the potential of each person; and Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its 
rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations. 
S. AFR. CONST. 1996. See also Dawood v. Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v. Minister of Home 
Affairs; Thomas v. Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) at 39 (S. Afr.) (“The Constitution 
asserts dignity to contradict our past in which human dignity for black South Africans was routinely 
and cruelly denied. It asserts it too to inform the future, to invest in our democracy respect for the 
intrinsic worth of all human beings.”); Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1997 (1) 
SA 765 at 5 (CC) (S. Afr.); Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and others v. President of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) at 38 (S. Afr.); The Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 [hereinafter Equality Act] (“The [Equality Act] 
attempts to regulate the promotion of equality to ensure that it becomes a reality in our country. This is 
an innovative feature of our Act, since equality legislation elsewhere in the world is usually only 
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of non-derogable rights.40 Under the Constitution, the right to dignity is as 
important as the right to life; they are the only two rights that may not be 
compromised.41 Many consider the right to dignity to be South Africa’s 
most important right.42 
Although it has engendered controversy,43 the equality jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Court is guided by the right to dignity.44 The Equality 
Clause of the Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, color, 
ethnic or social origin, sex, religion, or language.45 Infringement on a 
concerned with preventing discrimination.”). CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 1, at 
4. 
 40. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 36(1). 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including—(a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) 
the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; 
and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 1, at 1 (“The South African Constitution 
establishes a new democratic order based on ‘human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms.’”); see also S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 10 (“Everyone has 
inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.”). The references to dignity 
in §§ 1, 7, 36, and 39 of the Constitution further elucidate the concept’s importance. In South Africa, 
“a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human beings: human beings are 
entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern. This right therefore is the foundation of many 
of the other rights that are specifically entrenched in [the Bill of Rights].” S v. Makwanyane 1995 (6) 
BCLR 665 (CC) (S. Afr.); S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 328 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 43. See generally Cathi Albertyn & Beth Goldblatt, Facing the Challenge of Transformation: 
Difficulties in the Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 
248 (1998); DM Davis, Equality: The Majesty of Legoland Jurisprudence, 116 S. AFR. L.J. 398 
(1999); Anton Fagan, Dignity and Unfair Discrimination: A Value Misplaced and a Right 
Misunderstood, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 220 (1998); Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative 
Concept, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 848 (1983); see generally National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v. Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.); Hoffman v. South African Airways 
2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 44. See generally Brink v. Kitschoff 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) (S. Afr.); Prinsloo v. van der Linde 
1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) (S. Afr.); President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 
(CC) (S. Afr.); Harksen v. Lane 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) (S. Afr.); Larbi-Odam v. MEC for Education 
(North West Province) 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) (S. Afr.); Pretoria City Council v. Walker 1998 (2) SA 
363 (CC) (S. Afr.); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Home Affairs 
2000(2) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 45. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9. 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the 
law. (2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or 
advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be 
taken. (3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one 
or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
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person’s right to dignity has also been found to be discriminatory.46 
Moreover, as a non-derogable right under the Constitution, dignity sets the 
restrictive standards by which other rights may be enjoyed.47 
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 
The right to freedom of expression, which has been regarded as one of 
the quintessential principles of a democratic society, is one of the basic 
rights enumerated in section 1648 of the Bill of Rights.49 However, this 
right, although fundamental, is not absolute. From the inception of the new 
Constitution,50 freedom of expression has been limited by common law 
rules,51 by state interests,52 by the non-derogable status of the right to 
dignity,53 and by the speech provision of the Constitution itself.54 
language and birth. (4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly and indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be 
enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. (5) Discrimination on one or more of the 
grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair. 
Id. 
 46. Harksen v. Lane 1998(a) SA 300 (CC) (S.Afr.) at para. 47 (“There will be discrimination on 
unspecified grounds if it is based on attributes or characteristics which have the potential to impair the 
fundamental dignity of persons as human beings, or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious 
manner.”). 
 47. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 36; see also National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. 
Minister of Home Affairs 2000(s) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) at 57–58. 
 48. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 16. 
 49. Sections 7–39 of the Constitution are also known as South Africa’s Bill of Rights. 
 50. See Explanatory Memorandum, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, available 
at http://www.polity.org.za/html/gordocs/constitution/saconst.html?rebookmark (last visited Nov. 1, 
2005). 
This Constitution was drafted according to Chapter 5 of the interim Constitution (Act 200 of 
1993) and was first adopted by the Constitutional Assembly on 8 May 1996. In terms of a 
judgement of the Constitutional Court, delivered on 6 September 1996, the text was referred 
back to the Constitutional Assembly for reconsideration. The text was accordingly amended 
to comply with the Constitutional Principles contained in Schedule 4 of the interim 
Constitution. It was signed into law on 10 December 1996. 
Id. 
 51. See JONATHAN BURCHELL & JOHN MILTON, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 513 (1997) 
(“Crimen injuria is the serious, unlawful and intentional infringement of the dignity (dignitas) of 
another.”). 
 52. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 37, Table of Non-Derogable Rights. 
 53. Id. See also S v. Mamabolo (E TV and Others Intervening) 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) at 37–38 
(S. Afr.). 
 54. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 16(2). 
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A. Sections 16 and 36 
Section 16 of the Constitution, which provides for freedom of 
expression, is divided into two parts which must be read in conjunction 
with one another in order to fully understand the scope of the right to 
freedom of expression under this part of the Constitution. Section 16(1) 
provides broad freedoms,55 whereas section 16(2) modifies those 
freedoms.56 
In addition to limitations placed on the freedom of expression within 
the enumeration of the right itself, freedom of expression is also limited by 
section 36 of the Constitution.57 Section 36 provides a mechanism by 
which freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights may be limited in a manner 
beyond the scope of their respective provisions, to maintain the 
fundamental ideals of the State. However, a threshold standard does exist. 
Of particular note is the Islamic Unity case, in which the Court found that 
speech could only be regulated beyond the scope of section 16(2) if it 
meets the justification criteria of the limitations clause in section 36.58 
Nonetheless, both section 16(2) and section 36 act as direct checks on 
freedom of expression. 
B. Sections 9 and 7(2) 
In addition to the limits placed on freedom of expression through 
sections 16 and 36, certain Constitutional provisions related to 
discrimination also limited freedom of speech.59 Based upon the 
provisions of the South African Constitution, hate speech is a form of 
discrimination.60 Under section 9 of the Constitution, discrimination based 
 55. Id. § 16(1) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes: a. freedom of 
the press and other media; b. freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; c. freedom of artistic 
creativity, and d. academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.”). 
 56. Id. § 16(2) (“The right in subsection (1) does not extend to: a. propaganda for war; b. 
incitement of imminent violence; or c. advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or 
religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm”); see also Islamic Unity Convention v. 
Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others, 2002(4) SA 294 (CC) at 22 (S. Afr.) (discussing the 
constitutional limitations placed on § 16(1), including § 36); Gilbert J. Marcus & D. Spitz, Expression, 
in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 20–60 (Authur Chaskalson et al. eds., 1996) (noting that 
an additional effect of section 16(2) is that the government may regulate particular forms of speech 
without applying the standards of justification found in the limitations clause (Section 36)). 
 57. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 36. 
 58. Islamic Unity, supra note 56, at 23. 
 59. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9. 
 60. CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 1, at 4 (“Hate speech is seen as a special 
form of unfair discrimination.”). Note that this is very different from America, where hate speech is 
equated to racism instead of unfair discrimination when it occurs in public. See WALKER, supra note 
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on race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, 
color, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language, and birth is prohibited.61 Hence, provisions exist which 
would allow hate speech to be addressed as a form of discrimination. 
Furthermore, under section 7(2), the State must respect, protect, promote, 
and fulfill the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights,62 one of which is the 
right to dignity.63 
Although these provisions arguably provided the necessary instruments 
for the State to address the problem of hate speech, the drafters of the 
Constitution noted that the enactment of further legislation to prevent 
unfair discrimination on the grounds previously stated was compulsory.64 
III. THE DELETERIOUS EFFECT OF POST-CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION 
ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
A. The Equality Act65 
The adoption of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the “Equality Act”) fulfilled the 
requirement that further legislation be enacted to prevent unfair 
discrimination under section 9.66 The goal of the Equality Act is to give 
effect to the spirit of the Constitution through the prevention of unfair 
discrimination and the protection of human dignity.67 The Equality Act 
strives to “provide measures to facilitate the eradication of unfair 
discrimination, hate speech and harassment, particularly on the grounds of 
race, gender and disability,”68 and to meet South Africa’s international 
obligations relating to various human rights conventions.69 The Equality 
Act directly links the elimination of unfair discrimination and hate speech. 
17, at 1–14. 
 61. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 §§ 9(3), 9(4). 
 62. Id. § 7(2). 
 63. Id. § 10. 
 64. Id. § 9(4). 
 65. See supra note 39. 
 66. Id. § 2(a). 
 67. Id. § 2(b). 
 68. Id. § 2(c). It is important to note that in addition to prohibiting the grounds for discrimination 
found in section 9 of the Constitution, the Equality Act also prohibits any other form of discrimination 
which “(1) causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage; (2) undermines human dignity; or (3) 
adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person’s rights and freedoms in a serious manner that is 
comparable to discrimination . . . [on a ground provided in the Constitution].”. Id. § 1(xxii)(b). 
 69. The Equality Act specifically mentions the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women. Equality Act, supra note 39, pmbl. 
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The framers felt that to protect human dignity and prevent unfair 
discrimination, restrictions must be placed on freedom of expression. The 
State’s arguments justifying the regulation of hate speech are founded on 
this principle.70 
B. Section 10 
Section 10 of the Equality Act prohibits hate speech.71 Section 10 can 
be viewed as an attempt to distinguish between speech that furthers the 
principles found in the Constitution and speech that inhibits them.72 To 
fulfill this aim, the Equality Act set standards for preventing hate speech 
and established the Equality Courts.73 As of June 24, 2004, seventy-five 
cases had been lodged with the Equality Courts, twenty-three of which 
related to hate speech.74 The methodology established by section 10 
permits the court dealing with the case75 to refer it to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP), in order to institute criminal proceedings under the 
common law and the appropriate legislation.76 However, in order for 
proceedings to be brought against an individual, the conduct of the 
 70. Leaving this area unregulated has been thought to further circumstances of discrimination, 
inequality and assaults on individuals’ dignity. CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 1, at 
89. 
 71. Equality Act, supra note 39, § 10. 
(1) Subject to the proviso in section 12, no person may publish, propagate, advocate or 
communicate words based on one or more of the prohibited grounds, against any person, that 
could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention to—(a) be hurtful; (b) be 
harmful or to incite harm; (c) promote or propagate hatred. (2) Without prejudice to any 
remedies of a civil nature under this Act, the court may, in accordance with section 21(2)(n) 
and where appropriate, refer any case dealing with the publication, advocacy, propagation or 
communication of hate speech as contemplated in subsection (1), to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions having jurisdiction for the institution of criminal proceedings in terms of the 
common law or relevant legislation. 
Id. 
 72. Id. §§ 2, 10. 
 73. Id. pmbl. “This Act endeavors to facilitate the transition to a democratic society, united in its 
diversity . . . and guided by the principles of equality, fairness, equity, social progress, justice, human 
dignity and freedom.” Id. 
 74. Johnny de Lange, Deputy Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development, Opening 
Address at the National Equality Indaba, June 24, 2004, http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/ 
m_speeches/sp2004/2004%2006%2024_dmin_eqaindaba.htm. 
 75. In addition to traditional courts, such matters may be handled by Equality Courts, which are 
established under the Equality Act. Similar to the procedure of a traditional court, the Equality Court, 
under the powers provided in section 21 of the Equality Act may determine whether unfair 
discrimination has occurred and may have the clerk submit the matter to the DPP. The Equality Act, 
supra note 39, §§ 10(2), 21(2)(u). Note, however, that like a traditional court, under section 10, the 
proceedings must occur under relevant pre-existing legislation, and the matter in question must already 
constitute a crime under that legislation. Id. 
 76. Id. § 21(n). 
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accused must constitute a crime under the body of law in existence before 
the ratification of the Equality Act. In this regard, section 10 does not 
establish new criminal offenses, but instead allows for the prosecution of 
those criminal offenses previously established by law.77 
C. Section 30 
Section 30 of the Equality Act provides the Minister for Justice and 
Constitutional Development with the power to adopt an additional 
regulation under which a person who acts contrary to the provisions of the 
Equality Act is guilty of an offense and is liable for a fine or a prison 
sentence not to exceed twelve months.78 On January 21, 2000, a resolution 
adopted by the Ad Hoc Joint Committee on Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Bill requested that the Minister for 
Justice and Constitutional Development give consideration to: (a) 
developing legislation in Parliament which criminalizes hate speech and 
creates hate speech offenses in a manner consistent with section 16 of the 
Constitution79 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (“CERD”);80 and (b) taking other steps necessary to 
give effect to CERD and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) which have not already 
been provided by previous legislation.81 
 77. Id. § 10(2). 
 78. Id. § 30(3). 
 79. See also S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 16. 
 80. The Draft Bill, supra note 3, intro. CERD is an international treaty. Its goal is to eliminate 
racial discrimination by upholding the principles in articles 1(2) and 55(c) of the UN Charter, article 2 
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) and article 2 of both International 
Conventions on Human Rights. CERD, supra note 18, pmbl. In addition, the international concern 
regarding apartheid is considered a motivating factor in its creation. Id. Article 4 of the CERD 
mandates State parties shall “declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on 
racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or 
incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin.” Id. art. 
4. The General Assembly adopted CERD in 1965. Karl Josef Partsch, Racial Speech and Human 
Rights: Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in 
ARTICLE XIX: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE AGAINST CENSORSHIP STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 21 (Sandra Colivar et al. eds., 1992). It went 
into force in 1969 and has been ratified by over 129 states. Id. CERD was ratified by South Africa on 
December 10, 1998. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination New York, 7 Mar. 1966, at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/2.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2005). CERD is different 
from previous treaties dealing with discrimination in that it establishes lines by which States may 
implement measures to combat racism. It is left to the States, however, to determine how best to 
implement their obligations under the Convention. See CERD, supra note 18, art. 4. 
 81. The Draft Bill, supra note 3, intro. CEDAW was ratified by South Africa on Dec. 15, 1995. 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of 
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D. Comparison of Section 10 of the Equality Act and Section 16 of the 
Constitution82 
Section 10 of the Equality Act clearly restricts hate speech to a greater 
degree than section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution. First, the Constitution 
restricts hate speech based on race, ethnicity, gender, or religion.83 The 
Equality Act extends this list to include sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
social origin, color, sexual orientation, age, disability, conscience, belief, 
culture, language, birth, and any other ground where discrimination based 
on that ground “(i) causes or perpetuates systematic disadvantage, (ii) 
undermines human dignity or (iii) adversely affects the equal enjoyment of 
a person’s rights and freedoms in a serious manner that is comparable to 
discrimination on a ground [previously stated].”84 Although it could be 
argued that section 39 of the Constitution already restricted speech based 
on these grounds,85 prior to the passage of the Equality Act, numerous 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women New York, 18 Dec. 1979, at http://www.ohchr.org/ 
english/countries/ratification/8.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2005). In addition to these covenants, South 
Africa ratified the ICCPR on December 10, 1998. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights New York, 16 Dec. 1966, at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2005). Article 20, 
paragraph 2 of the ICCPR requires the prohibition of “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.” ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 20(2). 
 82. For an in depth discussion of section 16 of the Constitution, see Lene Johannessen, A Critical 
View of the Constitutional Hate Speech Provision, 13 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 135 (1997). For an in-
depth discussion of how section 16 may influence the interpretation of the Equality Act, see Albertyn, 
supra note 1, at 90–92; and Shaun Teichner, The Hate Speech Provisions of the Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly, 19 S. AFR. 
J. HUM. RTS. 349, 350–52 (2003). 
 83. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 16(2)(c). 
 84. The Equality Act, supra note 39, § 1(1)(xxii). These grounds are identical to those found in 
section 9 of the Constitution, which establishes the right to equality. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9. The 
justification for prohibitions based on these grounds is that “they have been used . . . to categorize, 
marginalise, and often oppress persons who have had, or who have been associated with, these 
attributes or characteristics. These grounds have the potential, when manipulated, to demean persons 
in their inherent humanity and dignity.” Harksen v. Lane 1998(1) SA 300 (CC) (S. Afr.) at 49. Note 
also that section 34 lists additional grounds including: “HIV/AIDS status, socio-economic status, 
nationality, family responsibility and family status.” The Equality Act, supra note 39, § 34. The 
Equality Review Committee is supposed to make necessary recommendations to the Minister 
regarding whether these grounds will be afforded the same status as those previously discussed in the 
near future. Id. 
 85. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39. 
1. When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
2. When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary 
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academics interpreted the Constitution to only restrict speech which 
squarely fell within its language.86 
Furthermore, the Constitution states that freedom of expression does 
not extend to “hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, 
and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.”87 Section 10 states that 
freedom of expression does not extend to words “that could reasonably be 
construed to demonstrate a clear intention to,” incite harm or promote 
hatred.88  
In addition, under the Constitution, an individual must utter words of 
hatred, which constitute incitement to cause harm in order to commit hate 
speech.89 Section 10 does not require that hate speech constitute incitement 
to cause harm, only that it could be reasonably construed as an intention to 
be verbally hurtful.90 Therefore, violence, whether imminent or not, is no 
longer a requirement for restricting speech. This represents the Equality 
Act’s shift away from the Constitutional restrictions of hate speech. 
Clearly, the language of the Equality Act takes a broader definition of 
what language may be classified as hate speech. This new standard 
exceeds the scope of those limitations provided under the Constitution and 
therefore further limits freedom of expression. 
Moreover, the Equality Act prohibits what has been termed as harmful 
conduct “in the air.”91 The language does not have to impact the person it 
is directed at; rather if a passerby construes the language to be hurtful, the 
speaker has committed hate speech.”92 
The only way to reconcile this matter is to interpret “incitement” in the 
Constitution to mean “intended,” therefore enabling speech which may not 
actually result in violence to be prohibited under the Constitution. This 
interpretation would not only prohibit speech which is intended to incite 
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights. 
3. The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are 
recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they 
are consistent with the Bill. 
Id. 
 86. See JOHAN DE WAAL ET AL., THE BILL OF RIGHTS [OF SOUTH AFRICA] HANDBOOK 228 (3d 
ed. 2001); Karthy Govender, The Freedom of Speech, 1 HUM. RTS. & CONST. L.J. S. AFR. 22 (1997). 
 87. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 16(2). 
 88. The Equality Act, supra note 39, § 10 (emphasis added). 
 89. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 16(2)(c). 
 90. The Equality Act, supra note 39, § 10. 
 91. CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 1, at 95. 
 92. Id. 
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one group to cause harm, but also prohibit speech which was intended to 
cause harm based on words alone, independent of any physical act. 
The most troubling aspect of the Equality Act is the inclusion of the 
terms “hurtful” and “harmful.” Before moving to hurtful, which must 
inevitably be less severe, the nature of conduct that can be classified as 
harmful must be determined. Conventional usage indicates that harmful 
would involve physical harm. Scholars have argued that harmful must not 
be interpreted in this way, however, because such an interpretation would 
effectively place “harmful” within the “incitement to imminent violence” 
provision of the Constitution.93 
In the Canadian case of R v. Keegstra,94 the court determined that 
“harm” resulting from hate speech included emotional damage, because it 
may have lasting psychological and social consequences.95 In contrast, 
other scholars have argued that “harmful” must include physical harm.96 
Either interpretation conflicts with the Equality Act. If “harmful” is 
categorized as physical harm, it falls within the realm covered by 
incitement to imminent violence. If it is characterized by emotional harm, 
however, then it falls into the category presumably covered by the term 
hurtful. 
These issues illuminate the more general problems with the Equality 
Act. The Act is both vague and overly broad.97 The necessity of comparing 
various sections of the Act and the Constitution in order to make sense of 
the provisions virtually ensures that the average person will not be able to 
make any determination as to whether the speech she is using is 
prohibited.98 The greater significance of this development is that if 
individuals become overly cautious in exercising their freedom of speech 
because they do not know where the lines are drawn, freedom of 
expression will be limited even further than required. Moreover, the 
definitions section of the Equality Act provides no assistance in this 
matter. 
If current case law is to be followed, cases brought under the Equality 
Act which involve off-color comments, may only be able to be brought 
 93. WAAL, supra note 86, at 320. 
 94. R v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, cited in Teichner, supra note 82, at 355. 
 95. See supra note 86. 
 96. CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 1, at 92; Gilbert J. Marcus & D. Spitz, 
supra note 56, at 20–63. 
 97. CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 1, at 96. 
 98. Id. In Kwa-Zulu Natal, a region of Southeastern South Africa, a man was recently found 
guilty for uttering a racial slur. Tania Broughton, KZN Man Guilty in Racial Slur Case, THE 
MERCURY, June 3, 2004, http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id= 
vn20040603024707302C410527. 
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before the Constitutional Court. In Islamic Unity Convention v. 
Independent Broadcasting Authority,99 the Court held that there is no bar 
to the enactment of legislation that prohibits the forms of expression set 
out in section 16(2) of the Constitution. Only “[w]here the state extends 
the scope of regulation beyond expression envisaged in section 16(2) it 
encroaches on the terrain of protected expression and can do so only if 
such regulation meets the justification criteria in section 36(1) of the 
Constitution.”100 The broadness of the prohibitions in the Equality Act 
demand application of the limitations standards found in section 36 of the 
Constitution.101 In this regard, jokes and sarcasm are sometimes hurtful 
and therefore may routinely engender constitutional analysis.102 
E. The Draft Prohibition of Hate Speech Bill 
South Africa’s Draft Prohibition of Hate Speech Bill, 2004, is the result 
of the request made to the Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Development by the Ad Hoc Joint Committee of Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Bill.103 The Draft Bill “penalizes 
any person who in public advocates hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, 
gender, or religion that could, in the circumstances, reasonably be 
construed to demonstrate an intention to be hurtful, harmful or to incite 
harm” or to undermine human dignity.104 In terms of punishment, violating 
the proposed law could result in fines and prison sentences of up to three 
years for first-time offenders and six years for second-time offenders.105 
The Draft Bill finalized its period for public commentary on June 14, 
2004.106 
Given that the Equality Act was criticized on both ends of the spectrum 
for being vague and overly broad, it was anticipated that the new Draft 
Bill would better define hate speech.107 However, it does little more than 
 99. Islamic Unity Convention v. Indep. Broad. Authority, 2002(4) SA 294 (CC) at 34. 
 100. Id. para. 34. 
 101. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 102. See CENTRE FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 1, at 95. 
 103. The Draft Bill, supra note 3, intro. 
 104. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
 105. Christelle Terreblanche & Angela Quintal, SA Hate Speech Bill Compared to Zim Law, 
INDEPENDENT ONLINE (S. Afr.), June 3, 2004, http://www.amren.com/news/news04/06/04/sabill.html. 
 106. The Draft Bill, supra note 3, intro. 
 107. See FXI Warnings, supra note 2 (discussing the dissatisfaction with the language of the Draft 
Bill). 
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perpetuate these flaws by adding undefined terms, creating 
inconsistencies, and providing penalties for violations.108 
Moreover, instead of creating offenses and criminalizing the current 
standards of hate speech, as is the Draft Bill’s intention,109 it goes further, 
restricting speech to a greater degree than the Equality Act.110 Similar to 
the Equality Act, the Draft Bill does nothing to distinguish between hurtful 
or harmful comments. Instead, the Draft Bill adds a list of new restrictions, 
beyond those listed in the Constitution and those found in section 10.111 
Furthermore, section 2(3)(a) of the Draft Bill applies to those who make 
statements “‘in public,’ without derogating from the ordinary meaning of 
those words.”112 This can be perceived as providing greater freedom, given 
that the Equality Act does not specify locations. However, the term “in 
public” is then defined as “in the sight or hearing or presence of the 
public,” which is followed by the definition of “in a public place.”113 If all 
public places are included by the second definition, it logically follows 
that the first includes private places that are in earshot of the public. 
Moreover, the Draft Bill no longer requires a “clear intention” as in the 
Equality Act, but only an “intention.”114 This change significantly lowers 
 108. The prohibited grounds for hate speech under the Equality Act are those enumerated in 
section 9 of the Constitution. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. However, the Draft Bill’s list 
of prohibitions uses section 16 of the Constitution, which is far more limited. Compare S. AFR. 
CONST. 1996 § 16, with the Draft Bill, supra note 3, § 2(1). This matter is further complicated by 
section 1 of the Draft Bill, which states, “[t]his Act does not exclude or limit the concurrent application 
of any other law in so far as the provisions of such other law are not inconsistent with this Act.” Id. 
§ 1. Essentially, the Draft Bill criminalizes hate speech based on race, ethnicity, gender, or religion 
only. Pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth may then only be prosecuted through the process 
established by the Equality Court. The Equality Act, supra note 39, § 21. The Draft Bill could be 
applied to these limited grounds and the Equality Act could apply to others, requiring criminalization 
to occur through the equality court process. However, if this were to occur, the Draft Bill would be in 
conflict with the object and purpose of the Equality Act, which provided the machinery for the Draft 
Bill’s inception. The Draft Bill, supra note 3, intro. The Draft Bill furthers this conflict, providing “[i]f 
any conflict relating to a matter dealt with in this Act arises between this Act and any other law, other 
than the Constitution or an Act of Parliament expressly amending this Act, this Act prevails.” Id. 
§ 1(2). The Equality Act has inherent conflicts with the Constitution regarding the scope of prohibited 
grounds. Moreover, the Equality Act provided the impetus for the Draft Bill. Even though the Draft 
Bill’s grounds may be constitutional, the empowering document may not be. This again raises 
questions of constitutionality. 
 109. The Draft Bill, supra note 3, intro. 
 110. Freedom of Expression Institute, Annual Report (2003–2004) 19–20, http://www.ifj.org/pdfs/ 
FXI%20Annual%20Report%202004_Digital%20Version.pdf. 
 111. The Draft Bill, supra note 3, § 2(1). 
 112. Id. § 2(3)(a). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. § 2(1). 
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the standard required to show that an individual intended his words to 
have a certain effect. 
Perhaps the most shocking addition is that of vicarious liability under 
section 4 of the Draft Bill, which states, “[t]he common law principles of 
vicarious liability apply to the criminal liability established by this Act.”115 
Under this provision, an individual may be criminally liable for another’s 
jokes. 
IV. NEITHER THE EQUALITY ACT NOR THE DRAFT HATE SPEECH BILL 
ARE NECESSARY 
As demonstrated in Part II, the Constitution provides significant 
protections. Numerous organizations have indicated that the protections 
enumerated in the Constitution provide sufficient freedom of expression 
while preserving notions of dignity and equality to a greater extent than 
post-constitutional legislation.116 
In addition to promoting equality and dignity, both the Equality Act 
and the Draft Bill seek to fulfill obligations provided by article 4 of the 
CERD (“article 4”).117 
 115. Id. § 4(1). 
 116. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 117. The Equality Act, supra note 39, pmbl.; The Draft Bill, supra note 3, pmbl.; CERD, supra 
note 18, pmbl. 
 State parties to the Convention are obligated in numerous ways. Although hate speech is not 
specifically mentioned in the Convention, racism which does not rise to the level of inciting violence 
falls within the scope of article 2(1)(d) of the Convention. Partsch, supra note 80, at 23. Article 2(1)(d) 
states “[e]ach State Party shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including 
legislation as required by the circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or 
organization. . . .” CERD, supra note 18, art. 2(1)(d). The acts which are prohibited are not specifically 
articulated. Id. All acts of discrimination that are not serious enough to fall within article 4 should fall 
within this provision. Partsch, supra note 80, at 23. However, criminal sanctions are not per se 
necessary. Id. Alternative methods such as declaring specific acts unlawful or taking educational 
measures may be sufficient. Id. Article 4 provides: 
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or 
theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which 
attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to 
adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, 
such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this 
Convention, inter alia: . . . [s]hall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of 
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all 
acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another 
colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including 
the financing thereof . . . . 
CERD, supra note 18, art. 4. 
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The introductory paragraph of article 4, which contextualizes the 
requirements of subsection (a), was highly contested from its inception.118 
It provides that state parties shall condemn acts of discrimination “with 
due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this 
Convention.”119 This matter accentuates the conflict between 
discrimination and freedom of speech. Numerous approaches were 
considered before the final wording could be agreed upon. The five 
Scandinavian countries maintained restrictions could only be imposed if 
they respected fundamental human rights, one of which is freedom of 
speech.120 
Once the language was settled, the issue of interpretation began.121 
Three viable methods of interpreting the obligations in light of the “with 
due regard” clause exist.122 First, parties may not take any action which 
would curtail any of the freedoms referenced in the “due regard” clause.123 
Second, parties must find a balance between the limitation of 
discriminatory acts and basic human rights referenced in the clause.124 
Third, parties cannot use the protection of civil rights as a justification for 
 118. Partsch, supra note 80, at 24. 
 119. CERD, supra note 18, art. 4. 
 120. Partsch, supra note 80, at 24 (citing UN Doc. A/6181, para. 63 (1965)). These countries 
proposed that restrictions could not “limit[] or derogat[e] from the civil rights expressly set forth in 
Article 5.” Id. Article 5 states that countries must guarantee inter alia freedom of thought, opinion and 
expression. CERD, supra note 18, art. 5.  
 121. Partsch, supra note 80, at 24. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (citing 20 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1318, para. 59 (1965)). The United States is 
an example of a country that adheres to the first interpretation. Upon signing, the U.S. declared: 
The Constitution of the United States contains provisions for the protection of individual 
rights, such as the right of free speech, and nothing in the Convention shall be deemed to 
require or authorize legislation or other action by the United States of America incompatible 
with the provisions of the Constitution. 
Id. 
 The position of the United Kingdom is similar to that of the United States. Id. The United 
Kingdom made a reservation, stating that legislative action is required in regard to the Convention 
only when it is necessary to achieve the goals of article 4. Id. The United Kingdom believed that the 
“due regard” clause adequately protected freedom of expression. Id. 
 124. Id. Numerous states, including Canada, Austria, Italy, and Belgium, have made statements 
indicating that they ascribe to this interpretation. Id. at 25 (citing Centre for Human Rights, Status of 
International Instruments, U.N. GAOR U.N. Doc. ST/HR/3, 99–126 (1988); Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Positive Measures Designed to Eradicate All Incitement to, and 
Acts of, Racial Discrimination (1986) (previously published as U.N. GAOR U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.119/10 in 1983) [hereinafter CERD Study]). Of particular note is the statement of the 
Canadian delegate, who beseeched the committee “to devise a balanced legal formula which would 
allow the law to reach such offenses without infringing human rights and freedoms.” Id. at 25 (citing 
20 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1315, para. 24 (1965)). 
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not implementing the restrictions on expression provided for in the 
Convention.125 
Although South Africa’s goal seems to be embodying principles 
represented by the second interpretation, in application, South Africa’s 
policies have come to resemble the third interpretation. Similar to the non-
derogable status of restrictions under the third interpretation, the 
Constitution makes the right to dignity non-derogable.126 The third 
interpretation “presupposes that freedom of expression can be reduced to 
zero by relying on the limitation clauses.”127 South Africa is in danger of 
entirely eliminating freedom of expression by relying on the non-
derogable status of dignity, the importance of equality, and the overly 
strict interpretations of its international commitments. Such actions cannot 
be justified. 
Moreover, such actions directly conflict with other international 
obligations which South Africa must observe. Article 30 of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (“UDHR”) states, “[n]othing in this 
Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.”128 Article 
19 UDHR states, “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through 
any media and regardless of frontiers.”129 Given the language already 
provided in the Constitution130 and the various accepted interpretations of 
article 4, South Africa need not use the Equality Act or the Draft Bill to 
meet its international obligations. Further, the language of the Equality 
Act restricts expression beyond the language of the CERD,131 which it was 
intended to support.132 
 125. Id. at 25. This conceptualization was developed at a seminar on recourse procedures that was 
convened by the UN Human Rights Division in Geneva in July 1979. Id. 
 126. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 36. 
 127. Id. (citing CERD Study, supra note 24, at 108 (discussing the general consensus of the 
seminar)). 
 128. UDHR, supra note 10, art. 30. 
 129. Id. art. 19. 
 130. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 16(2); see also supra notes 54–58, 83 and accompanying text. 
 131. CERD art. 4(a) (“[Parties] [s]hall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of 
ideas based on racial superiority and hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of 
violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic 
origin.”). Criminalizing hurtful comments goes far beyond the scope of this language. 
 132. The Draft Bill, supra note 3, pmbl. 
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CONCLUSION 
Restricting speech in the manner provided in the Equality Act and the 
Draft Bill does not serve South Africa’s goals. In a diverse society such as 
South Africa, there is a need for laws that prohibit incitement of racial 
hatred which results in violence.133 South Africa’s Constitution provides 
this protection.134 It is understandable, given South Africa’s past, that 
limitations on speech may be seen as a tool to promote dignity and 
equality. However, complete deterrence to the right of dignity can destroy 
virtually any other right, no matter how essential that other right is.135 
“Hate Speech” that could be construed as hurtful should not be a crime. 
The right to express one’s thoughts and to communicate freely with others 
affirms the dignity and worth of every member of society, and allows each 
individual to determine what is true136 and to realize his or her full human 
potential. Thus, freedom of expression deserves society’s greatest 
protection.137 South Africa’s own Constitutional Court has demonstrated 
that freedom of speech is fundamental on numerous occasions.138 
Concepts inherent in hate speech, such as ridicule, racism, contempt, 
harmfulness, and hostility are potentially open-ended and susceptible to 
widely divergent interpretations.139 In early 1990, following the political 
 133. JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 177 (1978). 
 134. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 16(2). 
 135. Davis, supra note 43, at 413. Laws which prohibit the dissemination of racial hatred, such as 
the non-derogable status of dignity in the South African Constitution, can be used as a powerful 
weapon by a government whose goal is muting those in opposition to the policies of the regime. See 
generally BOLLINGER, supra note 17. 
 136. Speech is “vital to the attainment and advancement of knowledge.” As stated by John Stuart 
Mill, the “marketplace of ideas” is the greatest value of free speech. “Being exposed to all 
perspectives, whether good or bad, helps to challenge an individual’s perspective, and therefore aids 
the individual in discerning the truth behind controversy.” ACLU, Freedom of Speech: The Backbone 
of American Human Rights, No. 10, http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Senate/9526/freesp01.html. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See South African National Defense Union v. Minister of Defence 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC) at 7 
(S. Afr.); S v. Mamobolo 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) at 37 (S. Afr.). 
 139. See WALKER, supra note 17, at 8. Hate speech has been defined as “any form of expression 
regarded as offensive to racial, ethnic and religious groups and other discrete minorities, and to 
women.” Id. (citing FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY (1981)). Hate 
Speech has also been defined as a “generic term that has come to embrace the use of speech attacks 
based on race, ethnicity, religion and sexual orientation or preference.” Id. (citing KENT 
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USE OF LANGUAGE (1989)). 
If a suitable definition of racist speech can be settled upon, the problems of interpreting and 
applying the legal standard to concrete situations begin. One possible approach, of course, is 
that of a continuing censorship bureaucracy. In the end, history teaches us that the 
“boundaries of the forbidden” cannot be reliably drawn. 
R. George Wright, Racist Speech and the First Amendment, 9 MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 23 (1988). 
“Restrictions on speech are almost always based on an individual viewpoint, and [u]nder current law 
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reforms initiated that February, the question was asked, “[i]s it possible to 
draft provisions . . . which would avoid making a future democratic South 
Africa vulnerable to arbitrary abuse of censorship?”140 South Africa’s 
history shows that control over speech leads to oppression,141 under which 
individuals are stripped of their dignity. Prohibiting speech does not 
prohibit attitudes of racism,142 intolerance, or bigotry, and perhaps only 
pushes them underground, where they may become more dangerous.143 
Hate speech laws may be important in redrawing the limits of what is 
acceptable in any society and in setting new standards of behavior.144 
However, hate speech laws are not accomplishing these goals in South 
Africa. As Thomas Paine stated, “[h]e that would make his own liberty 
secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this 
duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself.”145 Dignity is a 
there is the strongest of presumptions against view-point based restrictions [on speech]. These 
restrictions are almost automatically unconstitutional.” SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 13. 
 140. Johannessen, supra note 27, at 234. 
 141. It has been suggested that large numbers of white South Africans have adopted notions of 
racial superiority and the inferiority of indigenous peoples because of South Africa’s regime of 
censorship prior to the new Republic. Marcus, supra note 23, at 222. South African laws against racial 
hatred were used systematically against the victims of its racist policies. Id. If the people are to be well 
informed in matters of their fate and that of their elected government, they must be well informed and 
have access to all information ideas and points of view. “Mass ignorance is the breeding ground for 
oppression and tyranny.” ACLU, supra note 136. Even with hate speech restrictions under the Equality 
Act, black Africans, who are by far most often the victims of hate speech, have also had the most hate 
speech complaints filed against them. FXI Warnings, supra note 2. 
 142. Hate speech has not only been directed at white individuals. Recently, ANC party members 
have chanted the phrase “Kill the Farmer, Kill the Boer” at gatherings. Kill the Boer Slogan Outlawed, 
supra note 21. The Human Rights Commission initially found that the language did not constitute hate 
speech, but on appeal, due to an action brought by Freedom Front, reversed the decision. Id. 
 143. Denise Meyerson, “No Platform for Racists”: What Should the View of Those on the Left 
Be?, 6 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 394, 397 (1990). 
[T]here is [an] argument for intolerance, namely that tolerance of that which is evil serves the 
cause of oppression . . . [this view] overlooks the costs of intolerance. First, to drive an evil 
view underground can actually increase its strength; whereas to debate it out in the open is 
more likely to bring home its abhorrent nature . . . . Secondly, it is only too easy for 
censorship laws to be put to different uses from those originally intended and if we are happy 
for them to be deployed in one way, we make it much easier for them to be deployed in the 
other, more frightening, ways later. And a final consideration here is that, to the extent that 
racial animosities will continue to plague us, it is better to let them be played out at the level 
of words rather than to bottle them up, thereby not only increasing their virulence, but also 
making more likely a more dangerous kind of discharge. Forced as we are to weigh up evils 
here, we should therefore conclude that tolerance is more beneficial than costly. 
Id. 
 144. Michael Banton, The Declaratory Value of Laws Against Racial Incitement, in ARTICLE XIX: 
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE AGAINST CENSORSHIP, STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 349, 353 (Sandra Colivar et al. eds., 1992). 
 145. THOMAS PAINE, DISSERTATION ON FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT: CONCLUSION, in 
COLLECTED WRITINGS 296 (1995). 
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tool which can be used to inform individuals about the past and to provide 
a vision of the future.146 It should not be used as a means to restrict 
essential freedoms, such as speech, thereby stripping individuals of the 
very qualities that they are trying to instill into society. 
Ryan F. Haigh*
 146. S v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 328 (CC) at 329 (S. Afr.). 
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